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Mission Drift—
Understand It, Avoid It
By James Co p e s t a k e • i l l u s t r a t i o n s b y t y l e r p a c k

M

icrofinance is a potentially powerful tool to fight
poverty and help poor people raise their income,
accumulate assets, and cushion themselves against
external shocks. At the same time leaders of the movement recognize the need for a hard-nosed commercial
outlook if it is to be sustainable. To this end many specialized microfinance providers have formalized and scaled up
their activities while, in the other direction, many regulated financial institutions have expanded downstream.
Good reasons exist to welcome a boundary blur
between microfinance and mainstream banking. Only
with commercial capital can demand for financial services
among poorer people be more fully met. Closer integration also promotes innovation and greater responsiveness
to the diverse client needs. However, the danger that
commercialization of microfinance will lead to an overpreoccupation with profitability at the expense of poverty
reduction and other development goals is great—mission
drift is an ever-present possibility for MFIs and often
irreversible.
Because microfinance is motivated by development
as well as economic goals, the question arises how best
to evaluate performance against multiple and potentially
conflicting goals. The main issue is not so much the
desirability of broader performance measurement but
its feasibility. Technical performance management “by
numbers” is difficult under the best of circumstances;
measuring the impact of microfinance institutions using
even crude estimates of household income is technically
difficult, expensive, and perhaps better left to independent
researchers who can do it more rigorously. However, the
potential of microfinance as a development tool will only
be realized if financial institutions systematically and rou-

tinely measure performance, and if they do it in response
to internal demand, not in response to pressure from
other organizations.

KEY CONCEPTS
Three key dimensions of social performance are breadth
of outreach (the number of people using services during
any period of time), depth of outreach (the social status
of clients at the beginning of any period), and impact (the
net benefits to clients and those indirectly affected by
their use of financial services). Financial performance is
primarily the percentage of the service’s full cost that is
directly paid for by the users.
Innovations that reduce the costs of providing
services bring improvement in both financial and social
performance. But other decisions entail a trade-off over
time between them. For example, raising interest rates on
loans is likely to improve financial performance (assuming inelastic demand) but at the expense of current social
performance (due to reduced net benefit per client and
possible short-term reduction in breadth and depth of
outreach). Most benefits of trade-offs only come over time
because future social performance depends on both current social performance and on how financial performance
affects the capacity to supply services in the future.
Another example is the growth rate of the MFI. Many
MFIs have emphasized the prime importance of serving
more clients through growth. The cost of investing in
new capacity has a negative financial effect in the short
term, but this may eventually be offset by economies of
scale. Improved financial performance is also necessary for
growth in order to mobilize resources; therein lies the case
for lowering current social performance to enhance future
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social performance. In contrast, other
MFIs have opted for a slower growth
strategy: putting greater emphasis on
current depth of outreach and impact.
Such decisions reflect variation in
time horizons and, more importantly,
path-dependent judgments about how
current performance is likely to affect
future social performance opportunities.
Figure 1 provides a graphical
framework to aid thinking about such
strategic “win-win” options and tradeoffs between financial and social
performance. The preferences of the
MFI, or its mission, are represented
by a set of indifference curves (C1,
C2, and C3). The top preference is at
the top right corner of the box, since
this is the point at which both social
and financial performance are at their
highest. Conversely, the lowest preference is at the bottom left corner. The
indifference curves each represent a
set of points whose current social and
financial performances are equally
attractive. Movement upward and to
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the right, or to a higher indifference
curve, thus represents a move to a
preferred level of overall performance.
From any given initial level of
actual performance (pt), an MFI
is limited in how it can change its
position within the next time period.
Line PPt+1 reflects this room to
maneuver and is determined by the
scope for policy change, operational
reforms, investments, innovations
and growth. Change possibilities
over one period are illustrated by
the five arrows:
1. The horizontal arrow represents
a growth-first strategy, subject to the
rule that current social performance
should not get any worse.
2. The vertical arrow represents a
current clients-first strategy, subject to
the rule that financial performance
should not get any worse.
3. The arrow pointing upward
and to the right represents an intermediate strategy. Assuming the MFI
is successful in reaching the PPt+1

line, then this strategy is optimal; in
the case shown, it is pt+1*.
4. The arrow moving up and to
the left represents a trade-off strategy
of improved current social performance at the expense of financial
performance.
5. The downward sloping arrow
also represents a trade-off strategy—this time to enhance financial
performance by reducing current
social performance.
In addition to illustrating strategic
options, the diagram clarifies the reality
of mission drift: an unplanned or hidden change in preferences and resulting
behaviors. Mission drift is, at the heart,
a response to past performance—less
rational than a conscious change in
preferences but more than ignorant of
actual performance outcomes.
As an example, assume that an
MFI takes actions intended to take
it from point pt to pt+1*, but actually ends up at pt+1#. This in itself is
better described as mission failure
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performance outcomes rather than
being a fixed point against which performance can be guided and assessed.

APPLIC A T I O N
Since an important key to avoid mission drift is an accurate assessment of
performance, this section blends the
framework presented above with our
research experience with nonprofit
MFIs through the Imp-Act program.
We follow this discussion with other
lessons we have learned regarding
organizational leadership among
successful MFIs.
Revising Social Performance Assessment
Three broad points of consensus
emerged from our research as to
what any system of social performance assessment should include.
First, MFIs with an explicit poverty
mission should routinely monitor breadth and depth of outreach.
Although it was not possible to
agree on a standard set of indicators
for this, there was methodological
convergence between many MFIs
and their sponsors to adopt a combination of proxy poverty indicators.

Leaders in the field use a simple
but transparent scorecard calibrated
against national household survey
data and poverty estimates.
Second, MFIs should routinely
monitor client exit and turnover. If
clients choose not to leave and are not
hoodwinked or coerced into using
services, then this is a useful indication that the impact of the services is
less likely to be negative. It follows
that outreach data should, at the very
least, be supplemented by statistics
on exit, including routine reports on
why clients leave—particularly those
who only recently joined and whose
understanding of the terms of service
could have been inadequate.
Third, MFIs should invest in
capacity to assess progress toward
social goals by giving voice to loyal
clients too, through appropriate market and impact research.
Questionnaire-based surveys, semistructured interviews of key informants, and focus groups—all with
the priority to test, update, and
augment existing organizational
knowledge of clients’ experiences
rather than to provide rigorous proof
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than mission drift. From this new
starting point it is unlikely the MFI
would continue to aim for pt+1* in
the second period—pt+1* might even
fall completely outside any realistic
assessment of what is possible. In
such a situation, choosing a new
target outcome for the next period
without a change in underlying preferences is better described as pragmatism than mission drift.
At the opposite extreme, an
MFI could redefine its preferences
in order to provide a retrospective
rationalization of the actual performance outcome. In this example,
the MFI could express a stronger
preference for financial performance over social performance
(i.e., making the indifference curves
steeper until p t+1# becomes the optimal target rather than pt+1*). This
is closer to the idea of mission drift,
but it would also be a case of selfserving opportunism and is better
regarded as a special case.
A general definition of mission
drift is that the steps taken to achieve
a given performance outcome directly
induce changes in preferences.
Managers use current performance to
reset their desires and preferences for
what is possible in the future; they
change the shape and slope of the
indifference curves to reflect what
they see as the new reality.
In a mythical world of perfect
information, the directors of an
MFI would set performance goals,
the managers would make decisions
to achieve them, employees would
systematically monitor outcomes, and
everyone would learn. Unfortunately,
leaders of MFIs are handicapped
by the lack of timely and reliable
evidence about performance. Mission
drift occurs when their goals and
preferences for the future subconsciously change in response to actual
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Imp-Act stands for “Improving the Impact
of Microfinance on Poverty: An ActionResearch Program” and was sponsored
by the Ford Foundation. It was launched
in 2000 to explore ways of improving
the measurement and management of
poverty reduction by MFIs. Twenty-two
organizations successfully bid for support
to carry out their own action-research
over a three-year period, ending in April
2004. These comprised sixteen direct
providers of microfinance services, three
NGO promoters of user-controlled savings
and credit groups, and three MFI networks.
One premise of the program was that
debate over the social performance of
MFIs was dominated by external interests
(e.g., governments, donors, and researchers) at the expense of MFIs themselves.
Participants were therefore given freedom
to explore ways of improving their social
performance assessment systems to meet
their own needs rather than externallydictated ends. For more information, see
Copestake, Greeley, Johnson, Kabeer, and
Simanowitz’s book, Money with a Mission,
Volume 1: Microfinance and Poverty
Reduction, published in 2005 by ITDG
Publications. Or visit www.imp-act.org.

of impact—can accomplish
such purposes.
Returning to the theoretical
framework summarized by Figure
1, these practical lessons amount
to defining the Y-axis (social performance) as the number of active
users adjusted for loyalty and client
satisfaction (as a proxy of service
quality) and poverty status (with
greater weight given to poorer or otherwise disadvantaged clients). Social
performance is improved by serving more clients, by serving poorer
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clients, by broadening the range of
services they receive, by serving them
for longer periods, and by ensuring
that services do no harm. While this
definition falls well short of capturing
all aspects of an MFI’s social mission
(e.g., community-wide impact), it
does provide a baseline for assessment.
Performance Possibilities
Without denying the scope for managerial wizardry, the major determinants of financial performance are
well understood: realistic pricing of
products (particularly interest rates),
strong cost control and productivity enhancement, risk and liquidity management, portfolio quality
control, and continual innovation in
response to customer requirements
and market conditions. The key
question concerns how much scope
MFIs have to systematically improve
social performance while handling
these financial pressures. Our analysis
of MFIs participating in the Imp-Act
program highlighted four areas.
First, targeting has a critical bearing on depth of outreach. Serving
geographically defined poorer areas
does not necessarily mean lower profits because such areas may have limited competition, but it often results
in significantly increased depth of
outreach. Some MFIs directly target
poorer clients by using a poverty
means test instead of focusing solely
on geography. This is more controversial; deliberately excluding better-off
clients can reduce opportunities for
cross-subsidization and growth and
can weaken an MFI’s competitiveness.
But as with geographical targeting,
such targeting can also help an MFI
to develop its comparative advantage
in a specific market segment. Small
Enterprise Foundation in South
Africa is a particularly interesting
example because it operates poverty-

targeted and non-poverty-targeted
services alongside each other. This
enables it to vary the balance between
social and financial performance
goals through strategic reallocation
of resources between them.
Second, an even more powerful,
yet indirect, targeting mechanism is
product design. Most MFIs began
by replicating products pioneered by
others—solidarity loans of Grameen
Bank or village banking services
on the FINCA model, for example.
However, most have become more
flexible, have diversified their services,
and often have simplified product
terms and conditions. These changes
exert a powerful influence not only
on profitability but also on the kinds
of clients attracted and the extent to
which clients benefit.
Third, internal organizational
changes (e.g., front-line staff recruitment, training, and performance
incentive systems) are critical.
Performance contracts that seek
to align financial rewards of staff
to those of the MFI have become
standard practice, but better social
performance assessment (particularly
of staff- and branch-wise exit rates)
creates opportunities for aligning
staff incentives to social goals as well.
Social performance management can
significantly improve staff motivation,
retention, and productivity.
Fourth, an MFI’s room to maneuver depends upon their operating
environment—particularly the extent
of unrealized demand, opportunities
for innovation, the extent of regulation, and access to different forms of
finance. While individual MFIs have
little influence over these changes,
the range and quality of the external
relationships they forge with other
commercial and non-commercial
organizations is a critical determinant
of their social performance. In many
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countries a scissors-like combination
of increased competition and more
stringent terms of aid have reduced
short-term room for maneuvering,
forcing more radical cost-saving
innovations. While MFIs compete
with each other, they also collaborate
extensively through both informal
and formal networks. They seek flexible financial and technical support
from donors and governments but are
also wary of being overly controlled
by them. Strong financial performance and a good understanding
of the wider financial system have
opened up opportunities for some to
mobilize equity and finance debt to
permit faster growth.
Although the very existence of
MFIs may be a symptom of the
mainstream financial system’s limited
outreach, the quality of an MFI’s
relationship with it nevertheless
remains critical to its performance.
Meanwhile, donors and specialist
intermediaries provide MFIs with
financial and technical support that
can help soften the trade-off between
growth and depth and quality of
outreach. The main challenge facing
MFIs is to make good use of such
support without becoming overly
dependent on it or allowing it to
undermine their financial discipline
and autonomy. Performance possibilities or strategic options faced by
MFIs may have narrowed somewhat
due to increased competition and
tougher terms of donor funding, but
they remain substantial.
Leadership Implications
Our Imp-Act program research
revealed that mission and vision
statements covered all aspects of
outreach, but that their significance
depends on how much weight MFI
leaders and boards actually attach to
them in decision making. Tension

often exists between board members and senior managers—those
with stronger commercial business
or banking backgrounds and those
with stronger social or volunteering
backgrounds, respectively.
The phenomenon of mission drift
is also manifest in these terms. The
appointment of those with more
commercial experience in a quest for
improved financial performance may
be seen by other board members as
a means to improve long-term social
performance, but leaves open the
question whether they will be able to
retain control. In the case of MFIs
aiming for transformation into commercial banks, new board members
also bring financial responsibilities
to commercial investors and private
for-profit shareholders. These changes
can become self-reinforcing if newcomers also perpetuate further the
simplistic understanding of the nature
of poverty (i.e., simply a lack of access
to credit). In terms of Figure 1, such
drift takes the form of a cumulative
flattening of the indifference curves.
Larger MFIs have been able to
avoid such danger by combining the
acquisition of financial expertise with
sustained investment in improving
and updating internal understanding
of the nature of poverty at all levels of
the organization. This can be harder
for smaller MFIs for whom the bigger
danger may be more mission lock-in
than drift—being unable to control
or limit the process of commercializa-

tion once it has started. Leaders also
have a vested interest in lack of transparency about social performance
to the extent that uncertainty and
ambiguity give them more room to
maneuver in the struggle to reconcile
multiple internal and external expectations and demands.

CONCLUSION
Mission drift can most precisely be
defined as retrospective changes in
stated preferences to fit unplanned
performance outcomes. This is more
likely when an MFI’s goal setting,
performance assessment, and management systems are weak. Evidence
from Imp-Act suggests that many
MFIs do have strong social and
financial performance preferences,
significant room for maneuvering
to manage them, and scope to better
do so. Improved goal setting and
strategic planning, routine monitoring of the poverty status of clients
and ex-clients, a capacity for followup research into the reasons behind
observed changes, and periodic
internal and external reviews of these
activities and systems can all be
carried out more cost-effectively and
systematically. This can help accelerate the pace of innovation and growth
in a more poverty- and gender-aware
manner and help reduce mission drift.
It can also help to moderate some of
the more extravagant claims concerning the potential of microfinance
as a development tool.
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